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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jacob Randall entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of trafficking in marijuana
preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. Mr. Randall asserts that his
detention was unlawfully extended to allow a drug detection dog, "Bingo," to sniff his vehicle.
Trooper Tyler Scheierman abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop when, absent reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, he began questioning Mr. Randall about whether there
were drugs in the car. He then instructed Mr. Randall to stand on the side of the road, led Bingo
to the driver's side door, and then helped the dog through the open window. Without the boost
from Trooper Scheierman, Bingo would not have been able to enter Mr. Randall's car through
the window. Once inside the car, Bingo alerted. Mr. Randall also asserts that Bingo's entry into
the open car window prior to any probable cause, facilitated by Trooper Scheierman, was an
unlawful search and the evidence gathered should be suppressed.
Further, Mr. Randall contends that his seven-year sentence, with three years fixed,
represents an abuse of the district court's discretion, as it is excessive given any view of the
facts.
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's new argument on appeal, its
mischaracterization of Mr. Randall's purported nervousness, and its erroneous contention that
Trooper Scheierman had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing because he
believed Mr. Randall was trying to avoid police contact.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Randall's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Randall's motion to suppress?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of seven
years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Randall following his plea of guilty to trafficking
in marijuana? 1

1

Mr. Randall fully addressed his sentencing claims in his initial Appellant's Brief and the State's
response does not merit further argument.
3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Randall's Motion To Suppress
First, the State mischaracterizes Trooper Scheierman's testimony as stating Mr. Randall
was "extraordinarily nervous" (Resp. Br., pp.2, 17), and exhibited "extreme nervousness" (Resp.
Br., p.12).

This claim is not based on facts in the record as the officer testified only that

Mr. Randall was nervous, which he had also observed in drivers on normal traffic stops, and that
Mr. Randall's "nervousness" increased when asked for more details about his travel plans. 2
(Tr., p.30, Ls.5-12; p.49, L.25 - p.50, L.4; p.71, L.16 - p.72, L.18; p.75, L.12 - p.76, L.8; p.78,
Ls.4-18.) Nor did the district court find that Mr. Randall was "excessively" or "extraordinarily"
nervous. (See R., pp.114, 119-20.)
The State claims that Mr. Randall's actions, of slowing his car upon seemg law
enforcement, and of sitting "in an awkward manner with his face shielded from view" as he
drove by the trooper, provided reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. (Resp.
Br., pp.11, 17.) In support of this notion, the State cites older Court of Appeals decisions. (See
Resp. Br., p.11 (citing State v. Nevarez, 147 Idaho 470, 475-76 (Ct. App. 2009)), and State v.

Troughton, 126 Idaho 406, 410 (Ct. App. 1994).) However, these cases are distinguishable, and
the State's arguments are controverted by more recent, controlling precedent.
In Nevarez, the officer heard from dispatch that a convenience store had just been robbed
by two Hispanic individuals.

14 7 Idaho at 4 72. The officer watched traffic traveling on the

highway coming from the direction of the convenience store, and when he passed the car
containing the Hispanic defendants, the four people in the car exhibited "quite a bit of reaction"

2

Although Trooper Scheierman testified that Mr. Randall's nervousness increased when being
questioned about his travel plans, the trooper did not document any such "increased
nervousness" in his police report. (Tr., p.78, Ls.4-18.)
4

upon seeing a police car, including looks of concern or exclamation and the individuals moved
around in the car, as if hiding contraband or a weapon. Id. The driver was driving 13 miles per
hour below the speed limit and was overly cautious in the employment of a tum signal, and the
individuals in the car were sitting very low in their seats. Id. at 475. The Court concluded that,
based on a totality of circumstances, the officer had reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
individuals in the car were involved in the robbery of the convenience store. Id.
Troughton was a case in which the officer, while speaking to the occupants of an

unlawfully parked vehicle, saw open containers of alcohol. 126 Idaho at 410. Mr. Troughton,
the passenger, covered his face when speaking to the officer, who recognized him, and knew he
had provided a false name. Id. 126 Idaho at 408-10. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that under
the totality of the circumstances, the initial investigatory stop and the following detention of the
vehicle and of Mr. Troughton were reasonable. Id. 126 Idaho at 410. However, the Troughton
Court's findings regarding the face covering was combined with Mr. Troughton's providing a
false last name, which formed a basis for reasonable suspicion. Id. Here, Trooper Scheierman
testified that Mr. Randall's face was partially and temporarily obscured by his car's doorpost: "as
he passed Trooper Scheierman, [the driver] sat in an awkward manner with his face shielded
from view."

(Resp. Br., p.11) (citing Tr., p.20, L.6 - p.21, L.11; p.45, L.11 - p.46, L.1.)

Although the State focuses on Mr. Randall's conduct in initially driving by Trooper Scheierman
(Resp. Br., p.11 ), the district court made no findings regarding any suspicion attaching to that
conduct, even when considered with the totality of the circumstances. Despite the trooper's
suspicion that Mr. Randall was trying to avoid him, the district court did not use these facts in
formulating its conclusion that "Trooper Scheierman gained the reasonable suspicion necessary
to expand the initial detention to a drug investigation" from information obtained during the

5

encounter, not upon the moment he first saw Mr. Randall. (R., pp.122-23.) The district court
reasoned:
[T]he totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of the Defendant's
vehicle show there were specific and articulable facts that justify the reasonable
suspicion necessary to permit the investigative detention of the Defendant. For
example, the Defendant appeared nervous and shaking. His travel plans were also
suspicious and confusing based upon the Defendant's statements that he had taken
a $75.00 flight to Las Vegas and then spent over $500.00 to rent a car to drive
home to Minnesota. The Defendant also exhibited nervousness and changed his
answer when questioned about whether he had visited anywhere else during his
trip to Las Vegas.
(R., p.120.) However, these facts, even when considered in totality, support only a hunch.
In State v. Morgan, the Idaho Supreme Court held that an officer's belief that a driver is
trying to avoid him, without factual justification, does not create reasonable articulable suspicion
of criminal wrongdoing. 154 Idaho 109, 112 (2013). In Morgan, after the defendant made a
series of four left-hand turns, the officer developed a belief that the driver may have been trying
to avoid him. Morgan, 154 Idaho at 112. However, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the
officer provided no factual justification for that belief, and "[ a]bsent other circumstances, driving
around the block on a Friday night does not rise to the level of specific, articulable facts that
justify an investigatory stop." Id.
In late 2019, the Idaho Court of Appeals decided State v. Gonzales, 165 Idaho 667, 450
P.3d 315 (2019). In Gonzales, the driver of a parked car walked away from the officer and
refused to speak to him. Gonzales, 165 Idaho at_, 450 P.3d at 318. When the officer went
back to her car, he observed the passenger was either lying on the back seat or on the
floorboards, out of the line of vision of the police officer. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the
passenger's conduct and appearance of avoiding police interaction, did not give rise to

6

reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 450 P.3d at 322. The Idaho Court of
Appeals held:
While we agree that fmding an individual horizontal on the floor of a vehicle may
be suspicious, without more it cannot be a sufficient basis on which an officer
finds reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The fatal flaws in the State's case
are that [the officer] never articulated what criminal suspicion he had of
Gonzales' behavior, other than the fact that Gonzales was perhaps hiding from
him. As we have iterated above, an officer must "have a particularized and
objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity."
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. [411, 417-18 (1981)].
Gonzales, 165 Idaho at 77 4 (citations omitted). Similarly, Trooper Scheierman initially had a

hunch that Mr. Randall was trying to avoid him, which was not tied to a particular criminal
suspicion. 3
In State v. Kelley, 160 Idaho 761 (Ct. App. 2016), the Idaho Court of Appeals concluded
that Mr. Kelley's nervous demeanor-avoiding eye contact, trembling, and a pulsating artery,
even combined with a story that the car Mr. Kelley was driving belonged to his friend and he
was traveling from Oregon to Nebraska to return the car were not circumstances which "justified
the officer's suspicion that Kelley was involved in criminal activity." Id. 160 Idaho at 764. The
Court held:
Kelley's nervousness, evidenced by lack of eye contact, trembling, and pulsing
carotid artery, is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable
suspicion. See State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 919, 924, 367 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Ct. App.
2016) (holding "[a] nervous demeanor during an encounter with law enforcement
is of limited significance in establishing the presence of reasonable suspicion
because it is common for people to exhibit signs of nervousness when confronted
with law enforcement regardless of criminal activity").
Id. 160 Idaho at 763.

As for Mr. Kelley's unusual travel itinerary, the Court reasoned:
3

Although Trooper Scheierman testified that he found the fact that Mr. Randall slowed down
upon seeing the officer's patrol car parked by the side of the road was suspicious, thereafter the
officer admitted that he himself slows down when he sees a law enforcement vehicle by the side
of the road. (See Tr., p.47, Ls.8-21.)
7

Kelley's lawful, albeit unusual, travel itinerary is also not enough to establish
reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Digiovanni, 650 F .3d 498, 512-513
(4th Cir. 2011) (holding that while an unusual travel itinerary, coupled with other
facts, may support a finding of reasonable suspicion, facts such as an unusual
travel itinerary, renting a car from a source state, and traveling on a known drug
corridor, without more, does not create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
because it renders suspect a substantial portion of innocent travelers).
Id. 160 Idaho at 763.

The Court concluded that the route traveled also did not rise to reasonable suspicion:
Finally, Kelley's presence on I-84, a "drug-trafficking corridor," is insufficient to
establish reasonable suspicion. Interstate 84 is the primary east-west interstate in
this area and is used routinely by many innocent individuals who happen to be
traveling from east to west, or vice versa, and wish to do so in a relatively quick
and convenient manner. Using the only interstate freeway available, despite the
fact that it may be used by individuals engaged in a whole host of criminal
activity, cannot give rise to reasonable suspicion to search a vehicle as it would
subject thousands of innocent travelers to an invasion of their privacy for no more
of a reason than the use of the road. See United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935,
951-952 (10th Cir. 2009) (reasoning the probativeness of a particular defendant's
route is minimal because officers have offered countless cities as drug source
cities); United States v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820, 829 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding
traveling on a highway that was known to officers as a drug trafficking corridor
cannot alone justify reasonable suspicion because too many people fit this
description); O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 411 (Wyo. 2005) ("While we
acknowledge the importance of drug interdiction, we are deeply concerned by the
resulting intrusion [of searches justified based on our location along a nationally
recognized drug trafficking corridor] upon the privacy rights of Wyoming
citizens.").
Id. 160 Idaho at 763-64. Like the facts in Kelley, Mr. Randall's nervousness, travel plans, and

beating artery do not equate to reasonable suspicion of drug activity. The car's "lived-in" look
and an unconventional travel itinerary, or increased nervousness when asked additional questions
about the areas traveled to, are not objective facts linking the travel plans or increased
nervousness to drug activity. The State claims that Trooper Scheierman believed Mr. Randall's
origin and destination were related to drug trafficking. (Resp. Br., pp.16-17.) However, similar
to Kelley, Mr. Randall was traveling on the primary east-west interstate which was the quickest
and most efficient means of traveling across the State of Idaho. (R., p.113.) "The use of a
8

commonly traveled road does not give an officer suspicion to prolong a traffic stop." Kelley, 160
Idaho at 764.

"The officer's suspicion that Kelley's route from Oregon to Nebraska was

somehow related to drug activity was nothing more than a hunch." Id.
Because Trooper Scheierman prolonged the traffic stop for an unrelated purpose, a drug
investigation, that investigation must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of drug-related
criminal activity. Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015); State v. Aguirre, 141
Idaho 560, 564 (Ct. App. 2005). In light of the totality of the circumstances, the information
known to Trooper Scheierman does not create a reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal
activity to justify the prolonged stop.

A.

The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Randall's Motion To Suppress Because The
Dog's Entry Into The Interior Of Mr. Randall's Car Absent Probable Cause Constituted
An Unlawful Search Where That Entry Was Facilitated By Trooper Scheierman
The State concedes that Bingo only jumped halfway into the car (Resp. Br., pp.27-28),

but claims that the circumstances of this case are unique such that the trooper's conduct was
objectively reasonable (Resp. Br., pp.17-28). 4 The State also makes a new argument on appeal,
one phrased as a "but-for" discovery exception. (Resp. Br., pp.18-20.) The State claims that
even if Bingo's entry into Mr. Randall's car "was a Fourth Amendment violation, it was not the
but-for cause of the discovery of the evidence Randall seeks to suppress." (Resp. Br., p.18.) The
State asserts that Trooper Scheierman search the car and discovered the marijuana in the trunk
only after Bingo alerted on the exterior of the trunk, i.e., it was only the second alert, the one on

4

Mr. Randall's arguments regarding the dog sniff were fully discussed in Mr. Randall's
Appellant's Brief and will not be reiterated herein. Mr. Randall submits this Reply Brief to
address the State's new argument on appeal.
9

the exterior, that provided the trooper with probable cause to search the car. 5 (Resp. Br., p.19.)
Because of that alert," the State argues, "Trooper Scheierman had probable cause to search the
car that was entirely independent of Bingo's entry." (Resp. Br., p.19.)
In making this new argument on appeal, the State neglects to mention the fact that the
first time the dog alerted, it was inside Mr. Randall's car. (Resp. Br., pp.17-20.) The district
court found:
After climbing into the car, the drug dog went to the backseat and signaled the
detection of the smell of controlled substances. Trooper Scheierman then removed
the dog from the interior of the car and had the dog sniff the exterior of the car
where the dog also alerted to the trunk.
(R., p.123.) The State appears to be arguing that the first alert was irrelevant; that Trooper
Scheierman had probable cause to search the car after the dog's second alert on the vehicle.
(Resp. Br., p.19.) Such an assertion is preposterous and unpreserved for argument on appeal.
In a sly attempt to avoid issue preservation requirements, the State phrases its argument
without using the legal terminology for the well-known exceptions to the exclusionary rule. In
Wong Sun v. United States, the United States Supreme Court stressed that evidence that has been

illegally obtained need not always be suppressed:
We need not hold that all evidence is "fruit of the poisonous tree" simply because
it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the
more apt question in such a case is "whether, granting establishment of the
primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come
at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable
to be purged of the primary taint."
371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (quoting J. Maguire, Evidence of Guilt 221 (1959)). But the State
has not argued those exceptions here.
5

Trooper Scheierman testified that he saw Bingo alert in the backseat of the car. (1/25/18
Tr., p.36, Ls.13-19.) He then got Bingo out of Mr. Randall's car and redeployed him to the
outside of the car, "just for almost training purposes, because it really wasn't necessary .... "
(1/25/18 Tr., p.36, Ls.22-25.)
10

Instead of arguing causation exceptions through attenuation, independent source doctrine,
or inevitable discovery, the State crafts a new "but-for" exception. However, the State's new
position was not taken or argued below and is thus not preserved for appellate review. See
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017) (holding "[i]ssues not raised below will
not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which
the case was presented to the lower court."); State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, _ , 445 P.3d 147,
152 (2019) (same).
"When a warrantless search or seizure is challenged by the defendant, the State bears the
burden to show that a recognized exception to the warrant requirement is applicable." Halen v.
State, 136 Idaho 829, 833 (2002). One exception to the warrant requirement is the independent
source exception. State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31 (2017). "[F]acts improperly obtained do
not 'become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an independent
source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge gained by the Government's own
wrong cannot be used by it' simply because it is used derivatively." Nardone v. United States,
308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939). Here, the evidence was not obtained from a source independent of the
unlawful detention and dog sniff
Nor is the State's "but-for" exception an attenuation argument. Evidence is attenuated,
allowing it to be admitted "when the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and the
evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that 'the
interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by
suppression of the evidence obtained."' Utah v. Striejf, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006)); State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017).
Here, the unconstitutional police conduct happed seconds before and/or was ongoing when the

11

exterior sniff occurred-the second positive indication was not attenuated from the first
indication in the car or the unlawful extension of the traffic stop.
Perhaps the State's new "but-for" argument would best be classified as an inevitable
discovery argument, but even this assertion falls flat, preservation problems notwithstanding.
The inevitable discovery doctrine provides:
If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means
. . . then the deterrence rationale has so little basis that the evidence should be
received. Anything less would reject logic, experience, and common sense.

Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984). However, "[t]he doctrine must presuppose inevitable
hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal actions, not in series flowing directly from the
officers' unlawful conduct." State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 32 (2017).

"The [inevitable

discovery] doctrine 'is not intended to swallow the exclusionary rule whole by substituting what
the police should have done for what they really did.' " Id. (quoting State v. Holman, l 09 Idaho
382, 392 (Ct. App. 1985)). Here, the State failed to demonstrate that legitimate means would
have inevitably led to Mr. Randall's arrest for violation ofl.C. § 37-2732B(a)(l)(C), and thus the
exception does not apply in this case.
In Wolfe, the Idaho Supreme Court refused to consider the State's independent source
doctrine argument, finding it was not asserted below and thus not properly preserved for appeal.
445 P.3d at 152. The Court explained:
Further, although independent source and attenuation are similar doctrines, it
cannot be said that raising one necessarily implicates the other. While these
exceptions, as well as the inevitable discovery exception, all concern the causal
relationship between an unconstitutional act and law enforcement's later
discovery of evidence, their relationship is not so indistinguishable that it creates
an "all for one, one for all" method of argument. Should this be the case, there
would be no need for three distinct exceptions. The fact that each exception is
analyzed under a different test supports this conclusion.

12

Id. Below, the prosecutor argued that: (1) a canine sniff is not considered a search and (2)
Mr. Randall consented to the dog sniff (R., p.100.) The prosecutor did not make any argument
regarding the causal relationship between the trooper's unconstitutional act and his later
discovery of evidence in briefing or during the suppression hearing. (See 1/25/18 Tr.; R., pp.97102.)

Thus, the State's "but-for" argument, whether couched as "but-for", attenuation,

independent source doctrine, or inevitable discovery, fails because it is unpreserved.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Randall respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's judgment and
conviction and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. Alternatively, Mr. Randall
respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand his
case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 27 th day of March, 2020.

/s/ Sally J. Cooley
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 27 th day of March, 2020, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF, to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
SJC/eas

13

